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ACRONYMS
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, ISA was hardly taken note of in the European Union's external trade circles. With the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, and the European Union's new powers in the field of foreign direct investment, that has considerably changed. The European Commission, the European Union's main external trade actor, asserted its newly won competence to negotiate investment agreements containing both substantive protection standards as well as an enforcement mechanism in case of disputes, with ISA being the most prominent form of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
When EU trade negotiations started to include investment chapters, as in the negotiations with Canada on CETA, 1 with Singapore on an enlarged FTA 2 and with the United States on the TTIP, public interest in and opposition to what is sometimes portrayed as a secret parallel justice system for large multinational firms circumventing legitimate domestic courts intensified. Suddenly, the formerly technical questions of designing a cost-efficient, depoliticized and effective settlement mechanism for investment disputes became a major political issue in a number of EU member states. Growing opposition by grassroots movements and an alliance of various, often rather divergent political groupings threatened to halt trade deals the European Commission was negotiating. In a rare move, the European Commission interrupted its trade talks with the United States in order to conduct a public consultation in early 2014, focusing on the investment part of the TTIP. Ever since, ISA has remained the most controversial part of the planned trade agreements.
Against this background, this paper tries to analyze the position of the European Union toward the use of ISA as a means for settling investor-state disputes.
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FIRST STEPS TOWARD ISA
In spite of the pre-eminent practical importance of ISA since the European Union gained explicit power to negotiate investment agreements through the Lisbon Treaty, the use of ISA by the European Union
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NEW LISBON POWERS IN THE FIELD OF INVESTMENT
With the Lisbon Treaty, entering into force in 2009, 13 the European Union's external trade powers were significantly enlarged. They now include "foreign direct investment" as part of the Common Commercial Policy.
Since the Lisbon Treaty explicitly speaks of "foreign direct investment" and not generally of "foreign investment," a controversy arose as to whether this new competence in the external trade field was indeed limited to foreign direct investment, or could be regarded as a full "investment" power. Not surprisingly, the European Commission came out in favour of the latter, arguing that portfolio investments were implicitly covered as a result of parallel internal powers under the ERTA-doctrine, 15 while some member states remained adamant in limiting the European Union's powers strictly to direct investments. 16 Given this controversy, the scope of the European Union's competence on foreign direct investment under article 207(1) remains to be clarified by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in an opinion requested by the European Commission pursuant to article 218(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 17 This seemingly academic question has, of course, important political implications. Mixed agreements require adherence of the 28 individual EU member states, which would imply a kind of de facto 13 confers exclusive competence on the European Union also in this area. Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term 'foreign direct investment' only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise […] . The consequence of this would be that exclusive competence only exists for investment of this type whereas investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreements.") online: <www. unanimity requirement, 18 while agreements falling under the exclusive competence of the European Union are solely negotiated by the European Commission and require only majority approval of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
A further competence issue regarding the scope of investment protection to be negotiated seems to have been tacitly resolved in favour of EU powers. One could question whether the European Union has external powers to agree on expropriation clauses, typically contained in international investment agreements (IIAs), since the TFEU expressly reserves the question of property ownership to the member states. 19 Finally, and most importantly in the present context, doubts have been voiced whether the Lisbon Treaty powers concerning foreign direct investment also encompass ISA. 20 It seems, however, that procedural mechanisms to enforce substantive protection standards are seen as being implicitly covered by the latter power.
21
While the European Union is asserting its powers concerning investment, it is also clear that -with the exception of the ECT 22 -to date no EU IIA has entered into force. Thus, the roughly 1,400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of the European Union's member states 23 still form the basis for international investment protection of EU investors abroad and of investors in the European Union. Recognizing that the full transition to EU IIAs will require substantial time, the European Union has adopted a regulation establishing transitional arrangements for member states' BITs with third states, which basically permit the continued validity of such IIAs as well as the negotiation and conclusion of new ones.
24
Once the competence issues had been overcome, or at least pragmatically left open, the issue arose how the European Union would position itself toward ISA and other forms of ISDS, such as conciliation or mediation, as alternatives to recourse to domestic courts of the host states only. 25 
18
Based on a proposal made by the Commission after the finalization of negotiations and subsequent to the consultation or consent of the European Parliament according to Article 218(6) TFEU, the council adopts a decision to conclude the agreement pursuant to Article 218(2) and (6) TFEU. Additionally, in the case of mixed agreements, the members states' consent pursuant to domestic law is warranted. It has been the practice of the European Union that the council will only conclude an agreement once all member states have given their consent. The effect of abstention of individual member states remains unclear. In particular, it is questionable whether such conduct would be in breach of the duty of cooperation under Article 4 TFEU and whether the non-approving member states would be bound by the parts of the respective agreement covered by exclusive competences of the European Union by virtue of Article 116(2) TFEU. In this context, one has to take into account Article 218(5) TFEU as well, which expressly provides for the possibility of provisional application of an envisaged agreement in the sense of 
AN EMERGING EU INVESTMENT POLICY
In spite of the general recognition of these advantages, it was unclear after the European Union's new investment powers entered into force through the Lisbon Treaty whether the European Union would strive for ISA or settle for other forms of dispute settlement, possibly limited to the interstate level, for example, along the trade law paradigm to which the European Commission has become accustomed over years of experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. One should also not forget that shortly before the European Union started to consider ISA, Australia and the United States had found it unnecessary to include ISA in a bilateral FTA between two developed states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
33
After an initial orientation phase, however, the EU institutions finally came out in favour of adopting ISA, 34 although the European Parliament, in particular, voiced concern about this form of ISDS. 35 This latter concern, together with increased pressure from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) lobbying against ISDS in 2013, gained such political momentum that in early 2014 the EU Commissioner See e.g. European Commission Communication, supra note 15 at 10 ("ISDS is such an established feature of investment agreements that its absence would in fact discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive than others.").
35
European Parliament Resolution, infra note 43, para 24 ("Expresses its deep concern regarding the level of discretion of international arbitrators to make a broad interpretation of investor protection clauses, thereby leading to the ruling out of legitimate public regulations; calls on the Commission to produce clear definitions of investor protection standards in order to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements."). In addition, some documents emanating from the EU policy-making institutions provide guidance toward the European Union's stance on issues of ISA. In this context it is important to keep in mind certain basic division-of-powers principles of the European Union with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of trade (and now also investment) agreements. While the European Council (representing the member states) in the form of the External Trade Council has the final say in concluding trade agreements with a qualified majority, it also provides initial guidance to the European Commission in formulating negotiating directives. On the basis of the latter, the European Commission (as the European Union's supranational trade executive) is tasked with negotiating the agreements that have to gain final approval by the European Parliament as well. 
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regard to a number of investment-related issues. They suggested that an investment chapter should include provisions for fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and security (FPS), national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation and probably an umbrella clause. Regarding the level of detail, the instructions appeared to favour the traditional European approach by adhering to a rather concise treaty text, without clarifications limiting the scope of FET and indirect expropriation, as they are known within US and Canadian BITs as well as in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 47 With regard to dispute settlement, the need for direct ISA seemed to be unquestioned, although the precise contours were still open, given the difficulty of EU access to ICSID (and ICSID Additional Facility) dispute settlement since the European Union is an international organization and the ICISD Convention is open to states only. 48 The subsequent 2013 Council Negotiating Directives for the TTIP also called for the inclusion of "an effective and state-of-the-art investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism." 49 The qualifications that should be understood as "state-of-the-art" would reflect a number of the publicly criticized features of ISA and also take into account US practice in shaping ISA provisions. The European Union is currently negotiating BITs with China and Myanmar, as well as investment chapters as part of FTAs with Egypt, India, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco and Tunisia, Thailand, Vietnam and the United States.
50
The negotiations with Canada 51 and Singapore 52 have already been concluded in substance.
As of mid-2015, the most advanced outcome likely to reflect the European Commission's position on ISA is contained in the above-mentioned September 2014 CETA draft.
53
Before analyzing this in detail, however, it is useful to reflect on the public debate that has reached a remarkable intensity in some EU member states and that has even led to an interruption of the investment negotiations of the European Union, in particular those with the United States on the TTIP. In this contribution's final section, the September 2015 suggestions of the European Commission on a future TTIP investment chapter 54 will be analyzed. Enforcement: the Agreement should aim to provide for an effective and state-of-the-art investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism, providing for transparency, independence of arbitrators and predictability of the Agreement, including through the possibility of binding interpretation of the Agreement by the Parties. State-to-state dispute settlement should be included, but should not interfere with the right of investors to have recourse to the investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms. It should provide for investors as wide a range of arbitration fora as is currently available under the Member States' bilateral investment agreements. The investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism should contain safeguards against manifestly unjustified or frivolous claims. Consideration should be given to the possibility of creating an appellate mechanism applicable to investor-to-state dispute settlement under the Agreement, and to the appropriate relationship between ISDS and domestic remedies.
[…]."). 50
The See infra text at note 185.
THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON ISA IN EU MEMBER STATES
While the CETA negotiations triggered some questions and critical comments on investor protection and ISA in particular, 56 the TTIP negotiations led to a major public debate in several EU member states.
It is interesting to note that this debate was sparked in some member states and has reached a high level of intensity, while in others it seems to be a non-issue. In Germany and Austria in particular, NGOs and a number of politicians have questioned the need for ISA. Given the fact that both countries have a long-standing practice of concluding BITs, this may appear surprising.
57
The underlying reasons for this skepticism are complex and can undoubtedly be better examined by political scientists. Nonetheless, one could argue that the negative stance toward the TTIP mirrors the widespread phenomenon of "euro-skepticism" and thus a certain degree of mistrust toward EU institutions, linking up with the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s that led to the demise of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998. 58 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the general TTIP criticism coincided with National Security Agency/WikiLeaks revelations about US spying activities in Europe, 59 feeding into the notion of the United States as an overwhelmingly powerful trade partner that would outwit Europeans on all fronts, 60 including forcing their low standards (in European public perception) for health, safety, environment and labour in the production of goods ("chlorine chicken" being just one example) 61 on European consumers, as well as empowering US corporations to prevent legitimate European regulation via ISA.
From an institutional perspective, the European Council (still) seems to be in favour of the inclusion of an ISA mechanism in the TTIP. 62 While the European Commission initially used to strongly advocate this option, 63 the new cabinet under Jean-Claude Juncker adopted a softer tone toward ISA.
64
From a member-state perspective, it is worth mentioning that in mid-2014 the German Federal Council expressly rejected the inclusion of a specific ISA mechanism in the TTIP. 65 In the following months, the public debate, in Germany and Austria in particular, become increasingly hostile to the idea of including ISA in an investment chapter of the TTIP. ISA was portrayed as a special right of large transnational corporations to circumvent domestic courts. 66 In early 2015, the Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, led by their German branch, proposed the establishment of a permanent investment court instead of the traditional ad hoc tribunals. 67 In May 2015, the European Commission published a concept paper entitled "Investment in TTIP and beyond -the path for reform," 68 in which it highlighted the ideas of "strengthening governments' right to regulate, making arbitral tribunals operate more like traditional court systems with a clear code of conduct for arbitrators, and guaranteeing access to an appeals system." 69 Then, in the summer of 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution containing recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for the TTIP, pledging "[a] new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional judges in public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of judicial decisions is ensured the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives."
70
In mid-September 2015, the most recent move was taken by the European Commission. It went public with a draft text of the TTIP investment chapter, which, in addition to some adaptations of the investment chapter already found in CETA, contains a very detailed section on investment dispute resolution, proposing an "Investment Court System."
71
Major Points of Criticism
The arguments brought forward against ISA were not wholly new, partly rehashing topics from the NAFTA debate, familiar to the Canadian and US public, and epitomized by a 2001 New York Times article that notoriously likened NAFTA panels to secret tribunals. 72 The anti-investment groups relied on a number of serious concerns about the actual practice of ISA, combined with fears and anti-globalization rhetoric familiar from the Seattle anti-WTO campaigns of the 1990s. Recently, with the United States negotiating not only the TTIP with the European Union, but also a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Asian countries, opposition to ISA has also grown in the United States, as is well illustrated by two rounds of open letters from law professors, one urging congressional leaders to omit ISA from the TPP and the TTIP, 73 and a reply advocating a reformed inclusion of ISA.
74
Among the most prominent areas criticized by NGOs, and increasingly by the media in a number of EU member states, were the lack of transparency of the dispute-settlement procedure, the impossibility to appeal against investment decisions, the alleged pro-investor bias of tribunals and too-broad investor rights that would lead to a "chilling effect" on legitimate regulation by sovereign states. 75 With regard to the latter point, critics of the TTIP and CETA allege that ISA would lead to an overly broad investment protection, entailing a "regulatory chill."
76 They refer to cases such as Vattenfall v Germany, 77 Philip Morris v Australia 78 or Lone Pine v Canada 79 -none of which has been decided on the merits yet -in order to argue that sovereign states will be deprived of their right to exit nuclear power generation, to protect against the risks of smoking or to prohibit "fracking." 80 The regulatory chill debate is not new either, but largely resembles similar discussions concerning NAFTA's investment chapter more than a decade ago. 81 Interestingly, the public debate around investment law also turned to more technical aspects of the specific nature of ISA. The traditional confidentiality of arbitral proceedings was portrayed as a lack of transparency and a threat to public, democratic decision making because anonymous arbitrators could "force" sovereign states to undo their policy decisions.
82
While a number of ISA-specific issues did indeed raise concerns and had been discussed in investment arbitration and policy-making circles for quite a while, the anti-ISA campaign of the 2010s appeared to overlook, or chose to ignore, the multiple developments in investment arbitration over the last decade. In fact, many of these developments addressed core aspects of the criticism raised against ISA.
The perceived secrecy or lack of transparency of ISA, resulting from the confidentiality prevalent in commercial arbitration -although never as pervasive in ISA -has been significantly reduced, mostly through the work of institutions active in the role of administering ISA, but also by policy makers negotiating IIAs. In 2006, the ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended with a view to more transparency, now permitting amicus curiae participation as well as more general publication of awards. 83 In a similar effort, UNCITRAL adopted its Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration in 2013. 84 Pursuant to the 2015 Mauritius Convention, these transparency rules can even be made to apply retroactively to existing investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014.
85
At the same time, treaty negotiators have increasingly provided for transparency in the ISA chapters of IIAs. These range from publication obligations for awards and even submissions to permit access to ISA to third parties through amicus briefs and the possibility of public hearings. 86 As a result, ISA is often more transparent, and its outcomes more easily accessible to the public, than the normal domestic court system. See Open letter by law professors, supra note 74 at 5 ("The United States and Canada have been champions of transparency in investment treaty arbitration. Each has, since 2001, maintained a website where they post the awards rendered in the cases they defend. They also post pleadings, memorials, and procedural decisions. Mexico has followed the same practice in NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings. These materials are available for free. In that respect they are more easily and widely available than documents in most U.S. courts. The U.S. federal government maintains an electronic records system for domestic litigation, but users must pay for access ($.10 per page).").
Similarly, the notion that investors enjoy too-broad rights by being able to invoke unpredictably vague standards whenever their profits may be threatened 88 has been recognized by host states as inherently against their own interest and has led to a number of treaty changes, leading to ever more detailed formulations of the substantive standards of investment protection. 89 In parallel, IIA treaty negotiators have started to include clauses expressly recognizing the host state's right to regulate. 90 At the same time, it should not be overlooked that investment tribunals have refined their jurisprudence over the years, clarifying that investment standards are not intended to limit the legitimate regulatory space ("right to regulate") of host countries. 91 Further, IIA treaty makers have increasingly resorted to the use of joint commissions or committees consisting of representatives of the contracting parties empowered to give authoritative interpretations of IIAs.
92
Much time and effort has also been spent by various arbitration institutions and treaty makers to consider how appellate structures could be inserted into ISA. This started with proposals for amending the ICSID Convention a decade ago, 93 and also led to the inclusion of possible appellate mechanisms in individual IIAs. 94 
88
See e.g. Open letter by the Alliance for Justice, supra note 73 at 1 ("ISDS grants foreign corporations a special legal privilege, the right to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a government for actions that allegedly cause a loss of profit for the corporation. Essentially, corporations use ISDS to challenge government policies, actions, or decisions that they allege reduce the value of their investments."). 89 See also infra text at note 105. 90 See e.g. Norwegian Draft Model BIT (2007), art 12, online: <www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draftmodel-agreement-english.pdf> ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns."); Finland-China BIT (2004), art 6(6), online: <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad. org/Download/TreatyFile/733> ("Provided that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination by a Contracting Party, or a disguised investment restrict, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as preventing the Contracting Parties from taking any measure necessary for the maintenance of public order."); see also EFTA-Singapore FTA (2002), art 43, online: <www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade-relations/singapore/EFTA-Singapore%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf> ("Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure consistent with this Chapter that is in the public interest, such as measures to meet health, safety or environmental concerns"); Consolidated CETA text, supra note 1, Preamble ("Recognizing that the provisions of this Agreement preserve the right to regulate within their territories and resolving to preserve their flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the promotion and protection of cultural diversity" With regard to the perceived dominance of self-interested, unaccountable lawyers as arbitrators, who "rotate between being arbitrators and bringing cases for corporations against governments," 95 various arbitration institutions have adopted and revised their conflict-of-interest rules, which subject arbitrators to strict ethical rules concerning their independence and impartiality. 96 Failure to comply with these demands leads to disqualification from sitting on a tribunal. Furthermore, investment arbitration practice since 2000 demonstrates that tribunals have become more sensitive to allegations of actual or perceived lack of independence or impartiality of arbitrators, resulting in a number of successful arbitrator challenges. 97 Further, and linked to the argument that ISA merely serves big corporate interests, it is sometimes asserted that investors often resort to abusive litigation by bringing highly expensive proceedings before investment tribunals, which forces host states into costly settlements.
Finally, critics argue that ISA circumvents the national judiciary and is thus a form of "privatized" dispute settlement lacking democratic legitimacy 98 and offering a preferential procedural treatment not enjoyed by domestic investors.
The European Commission's Reflection Period and Consultations on ISA
Toward the end of 2013, public criticism of investment protection, and of ISA in particular, gained such momentum that the European Commission interrupted the TTIP negotiations and announced a "reflection period" in late January 2014. 99 This led to a public consultation in which the European Commission invited the public to comment on various issues of its trade policy. The questions posed included specific sections dealing with ISA.
100
In the course of this public consultation, the European Commission received a total of 149,399 online contributions. The largest number of replies was received from the United Kingdom (52,008), followed by Austria (33,753) and Germany (32,513). 101 Depending on the specific interests of the respective participants of this survey, the opinions submitted to the European Commission have been divided. However, the general outcome of the consultation fairly unambiguously reflects a broad opposition 95 See Open letter by the Alliance for Justice, supra note 73 at 1 ("ISDS proceedings lack many of the basic protections and procedures of the justice system normally available in a court of law. There is no appeals process. There is no oversight or accountability of the private lawyers who serve as arbitrators, many of whom rotate between being arbitrators and bringing cases for corporations against governments. The system is also a one-way ratchet because corporations can sue, forcing governments to spend significant resources, while governments impacted by foreign corporations cannot bring any claims."); to ISA in the TTIP or in general and, in some cases, even to the TTIP as such. 102 As the European Commission's assessment noted, out of nearly 150,000 responses, almost 145,000 were more or less identical answers, sent in a copy/paste fashion by individuals on the basis of answers prepared by NGOs.
103 Nevertheless, some 3,000 individuals, as well as 450 organizations representing EU civil society (business organizations, trade unions, consumer organizations, law firms, academics, etc.) participated in the consultation.
THE MAIN FEATURES OF ISA IN THE CANADA-EU CETA
While ISA was negotiated together with the substantive investment protection provisions in the agreement with Canada, the public debate not only called for various reforms with regard to the perceived deficiencies of ISA, as contained in most of the traditional EU member state IIAs, it also led to increased opposition toward ISA in general. 104 Since much of the specific criticism voiced against traditional ISA coincided with the ISA skepticism debated within NAFTA countries, the European Commission found a ready interlocutor on the Canadian side to negotiate a number of new features in response to ISA criticism.
In fact, a number of issues raised by critics of ISA relate not only to the dispute-settlement method of ISA, but also to the scope of protection under IIAs and the scope of rights granted to investors under typical IIA substantive protection standards. Thus, these issues and the way treaty negotiators tried to cope with them will be addressed as well. As can be seen in the following analysis, the draft CETA text contains a number of novel features that reflect the negotiators' attempt to limit investor rights quite considerably, compared to traditional IIAs and BITs.
Limits to Investor Rights in Order to Secure Host States' Right to Regulate
As already mentioned, many of the points of criticism voiced against ISA in the most recent anti-ISA debate in some EU member states were not entirely new and have already been addressed on various levels.
The draft CETA text similarly demonstrates that EU negotiators have attempted to seriously react to perceived pro-investor bias in traditional IIAs. The resulting investment chapter of the CETA clearly limits investor rights, compared to the texts of previous IIAs, and it specifically uses language aimed at improving ISA.
More Precise and Limited Protection Standards
The concern that investment protection standards would be too vague and imprecise, potentially leading to an investor protection level that could threaten the regulatory freedom of host states and the legitimate exercise of their right to regulate, 105 has been addressed by incorporating clear language that host state rights should not be unduly limited.
The traditional IIA or BIT concluded by EU member states in the past contained similar substantive treatment standards: typically, the twin obligations of FET as well as FPS (often even contained in a single provision) and the two non-discrimination obligations of national treatment and MFN, frequently supplemented by prohibitions against arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. A further cornerstone of European BITs has always been the guarantee that investors would not be expropriated -directly or indirectly -except in the public interest, in a non-discriminatory way, according to due process and -most important in practice -under the condition that they receive adequate, prompt and effective compensation. Less uniformly contained in BITs are so-called umbrella clauses, while "free transfer of funds" guarantees are regularly found in IIAs.
The often laconic language of such protection standards has increasingly been regarded as a potential threat to the regulatory sovereignty of host states. Thus, a number of BITs, in particular the Canadian and US Model BITs of 2004, 106 and subsequent treaty practice have started to adopt more restrictive language aimed at ensuring that investor rights are not interpreted too broadly. In parallel, investment arbitration decisions have become increasingly cautious and tribunals have started to explicitly balance investor and host state rights.
A Specific Restriction of the FET Standard
The most critically viewed investment protection standard is FET, which is also the most often invoked one. The detailed wording of the CETA's FET standard can be regarded as a "codification" of the more restrictive elements of FET jurisprudence by investment tribunals, which have emphasized the sovereign right to regulate of host states and held that mere changes in the regulatory environment or legitimate regulatory actions do not normally constitute violations of FET.
107
In fact, the usual short FET clause stipulating that "[e]ach Party shall accord in its territory to investors and to covered investments of the other Party fair and equitable treatment" 108 is accompanied by a paragraph defining a breach of the FET obligation as a measure or series of measures constituting:
• denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;
• fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings;
• manifest arbitrariness;
• targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief;
• abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or
• a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
109
Apparently, the CETA drafters incorporated many elements found in arbitration practice, although, presumably intentionally, not all of them. For instance, "stability," an element usually identified by investment tribunals in attempts to define the content of FET, 110 and normally serving investor interests, is clearly missing in the draft CETA text. This indicates that the negotiating parties intended not to make CETA's FET version too "investor-friendly." It seems to underline the intention expressed in the November 2013 European Commission factsheet, "Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements," to "confirm, as a standing principle, the Parties' right to regulate and to pursue legitimate public policy objectives" and to "set out precisely what elements are covered and thus prohibited" by FET in EU investment agreements. In addition to the specific terms of the Treaty, the significant number of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, that have dealt with this standard also unequivocally shows that fair and equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability.
[…] 277. It is not a question of whether the legal framework might need to be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to changing circumstances, but neither is it a question of whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to the contrary have been made. The law of foreign investment and its protection has been developed with the specific objective of avoiding such adverse legal effects."). 
FPS Limited to Physical Security
The overall limiting tendency underlying CETA's substantive treatment provisions is also evident in the context of FPS. However, it is not in the sense that FPS would be limited by the customary international law minimum standard, as one might have expected, given the NAFTA heritage of such an approach. 112 Rather, the limiting element derives from another strand of FPS jurisprudence. While the draft CETA article containing FPS, combined with FET, merely requires that "[e]ach Party shall accord in its territory to investors and to covered investments of the other Party [fair and equitable treatment and] full protection and security," paragraph 6 of this article clarifies that "full protection and security" is limited to "physical security."
113 This limitation must be understood against the background of a jurisprudential divide according to which some investment tribunals have held that FPS would be limited to prevent actual physical security of investors and investments, 114 whereas others have considered that the standard would go "beyond physical security." 115 While the clarification in the draft CETA text will ensure that FPS can be invoked only in cases concerning physical interferences with investments, it is questionable whether this will imply a significant reduction of protection for investors, since most non-physical interferences constitute violations of the FET standard.
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate
Similarly, the expropriation provision of CETA, which resembles the typical expropriation clause found in many European BITs, 116 is expressly made subject to clarifications in an annex on expropriation. This annex reproduces the shared understandings already expressed in the Canadian Model BIT 2004 117 and the US Model BIT 2012.
118
This understanding within CETA sets out that a finding of indirect expropriation requires a case-bycase, fact-based inquiry and provides a number of relevant factors, such as the economic impact of the measure, its duration, the extent to which it interferes with "distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations," and the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their object, context and intent, in order to determine whether specific measures constitute indirect expropriation. Finally, the understanding contains language inspired by the police powers doctrine, 119 aimed at ensuring that bona fide regulation in the public interest should not be considered expropriatory, 120 which in turn is reflective of investment arbitration jurisprudence on the limits of indirect expropriation. 121 While such language will not be able to solve all issues, it clearly constitutes helpful guidance to investment tribunals.
The approach is also in line with the November 2013 European Commission factsheet, which specifically stated that "future EU agreements will provide a detailed set of provisions giving guidance to arbitrators on how to decide whether or not a government measure constitutes indirect expropriation. In particular, when the state is protecting the public interest in a non-discriminatory way, the right of the state to regulate should prevail over the economic impact of those measures on the investor."
122 It seems that the European Commission thereby adopted not only the Canadian approach, but also followed the wishes of the European Parliament to find a "clear and fair balance between public welfare objectives and private interests" in defining indirect expropriation.
123
MFN Treatment Excluding Maffezini
Also with regard to the non-discrimination standard of MFN treatment, the draft CETA text contains two significant limitations, which contrast with the considerable extension of the national treatment obligation to the pre-investment phase.
124
Reacting to the uncertainty created by investment tribunals in the aftermath of the Maffezini case, 125 whether an MFN clause should permit claimants to invoke more favourable procedural (possibly even jurisdictional 126 ) provisions in third-country BITs or at least to overcome procedural obstacles, such as waiting periods, 127 or whether it would not permit them to do so, 128 the draft MFN clause of the CETA expressly excludes ISA. 129 Secondly, the CETA MFN clause contains innovative language aimed at preventing not only the "importation" of more favourable dispute-settlement provisions, but also, more generally, of better treatment standards contained in third-country IIAs, 130 something routinely allowed in investment arbitration.
131 CETA will thereby ensure that the specifically negotiated limitations of the scope of FET, FPS and indirect expropriation cannot be circumvented by reliance on more favourable provisions in third-country IIAs.
Overall, the substantive treatment provisions in the draft CETA demonstrate a very cautious approach to investment protection, which has led commentators to conclude that they will provide only a low level of protection and a great deal of freedom for host states to regulate.
132
Treaty Interpretation by the Contracting Parties
While the more detailed formulation of the precise scope of the substantive protection standards is guided by the goal of securing host states' right to regulate, the same purpose is intended to be served by a legal device allowing the parties to CETA to amend the treaty in a flexible way through a joint committee, without the need to resort to formal renegotiation.
According to the draft text, CETA will set up a Trade Committee empowered to adopt interpretations and amendments of some of the CETA provisions.
133 With regard to the investment chapter, CETA also envisages a Committee on Services and Investment, which is intended to serve as a forum for consultations between the parties on "possible improvements of this Chapter, in particular in the light of experience and developments in other international fora."
134 In addition to its various advisory functions in the field of the planned appellate structure of CETA, 135 the Committee on Services and Investment should have the power to recommend to the Trade Committee interpretations and clarifications of substantive investment protection standards of CETA.
This emphasizes the mutual interdependence of treaty makers and investment tribunals, in particular in regard to the FET clause by offering the contracting parties (through the Trade Committee and the Committee on Services and Investment) the possibility of reviewing and clarifying the specific content of FET by adding further elements.
136 This is an interesting alternative to the authoritative interpretation approach pursued by NAFTA article 1131, which has led to a number of sometimes controversial interpretations, including the one that stipulated that NAFTA's FET does not go beyond the customary international law minimum standard. The parties will thus be able to correct "unexpected" or otherwise "unwelcome" interpretations of substantive treaty provisions by investment tribunals.
SPECIFIC ISA-RELEVANT ASPECTS OF CETA
In addition to spelling out very clearly, in regard to the applicable substantive investment protection standards, that investment tribunals should not limit the policy space of host states, the draft CETA text also specifically addresses a number of the major points of criticism raised against the system of ISA itself, ranging from the perceived or actual lack of transparency, of appellate review, of arbitrator independence or pro-investor or pro-state bias, among others.
What Relationship to the National Judiciary? Avoidance of Parallel Proceedings
The argument that ISA allows investors to bypass or circumvent domestic adjudication is often an oversimplification. While ISA is frequently portrayed as a dangerous avoidance of domestic courts, 140 one should not forget that one of the initial purposes of ISA was precisely to have access to a more neutral international forum instead of the local courts of the host state that is a party to the dispute 141 and, of course, to serve as an alternative to diplomatic protection.
A related issue is the question of whether investors should have both domestic and international recourse. Traditional rules of diplomatic protection required the exhaustion of local remedies before international dispute-settlement options could be accessed. While this requirement is expressly dispensed within the ICSID Convention in general, 142 most other investment tribunals have also permitted investors to sue without requiring them to exhaust local remedies. Some IIAs expressly address the issue of parallel litigation and try to design rules to avoid such duplication, which range from fork-in-the-road to exhaustion of local remedies clauses.
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The draft CETA text also contains language to this effect. It neither requires nor prohibits investors to first litigate their claims in domestic fora; rather, it seeks to prevent parallel proceedings by permitting access to ISA only when a final determination has been made or the investor claims have been effectively withdrawn. where it has initiated a claim or proceeding seeking compensation or damages before a tribunal or court under domestic or international law with respect to any measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in its claim to arbitration, provides a declaration that: a final award, judgment or decision has been made; or it has withdrawn any such claim or proceeding; […] .").
A related issue is the fear that ISA may be used to circumvent the domestic judiciary for purely contractual claims against host states. 145 In fact, this is a complex problem that needs careful attention.
The main tool to raise claims that are usually settled by domestic courts before investment tribunals are so-called umbrella or observance-of-obligations clauses, which require states to respect the obligations they entered into with regard to a specific investment. 146 A good example is found in the ECT to which the European Union is a party. It provides that host states shall observe "any obligations" they have "entered into with an Investor." 147 In other words, umbrella clauses potentially bring contractual and other individual obligations within the ambit of an IIA and thus make them enforceable through ISA.
In this context, it is important to note that Canada has traditionally resisted umbrella clauses and that while the draft CETA investment text of November 21, 2013, contained an EU suggestion for an umbrella clause, 148 the current final draft agreement does not contain such a clause. 149 This implies that contractual disagreements and disputes cannot be brought under the protection of CETA.
Further, article X.17 of the CETA draft is unambiguous in permitting only so-called treaty claims. 150 Hence, this provision excludes investment disputes concerning contractual issues from being litigated under the ISDS chapter of the treaty. This is evident when comparing the current formulation with broader dispute settlement clauses in other IIAs. 151 
An Appellate Mechanism
The CETA draft also reacts to a political demand, countering the threat of an unpredictable and inconsistent jurisprudence by envisaging the creation of an appellate mechanism similar to some of the new US IIAs and the US Model BIT. 152 The CETA draft specifically entrusts the Committee on Services and Investment to provide a consultation forum for the CETA parties to consider whether such a mechanism "to review, on points of law, awards rendered by a tribunal," pursuant to the ISDS chapter, should be created in the future. 153 This relates to a long-standing debate in investment law circles about the feasibility and usefulness of the creation of a "second instance" in this form of dispute settlement. 154 Although an appellate mechanism would clearly prolong proceedings and lead to higher litigation costs, it is often asserted that such a mechanism would foster the uniformity and predictability of the outcomes of investment disputes. In this context, the WTO dispute-settlement system, which has provided for an appellate mechanism in the form of the Appellate Body since 1995, 155 is frequently invoked as a reference point. 156 Nevertheless, the draft CETA text falls short of establishing an appellate mechanism. Rather, it merely outlines some of the main features mentioned in the treaty mandate given to the Committee on Services and Investment, which are to be taken into account when designing such a system. These features include:
• the nature and composition of an appellate mechanism;
• the applicable scope and standard of review;
• transparency of proceedings of an appellate mechanism;
• the effect of decisions by an appellate mechanism;
• the relationship of review by an appellate mechanism to the arbitration rules that may be selected under article X.22 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration); and
• the relationship of review by an appellate mechanism to domestic laws and international law on the enforcement of arbitral awards.
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Arbitration Made More Transparent
One of the main public concerns about ISA is its perceived lack of transparency. ISA is often portrayed as secret justice by private arbitrators, taking place behind closed doors and leaving the public affected by its outcome in the dark. 158 This criticism ignores major changes in investment arbitration over the last 10 to 15 years, which have developed the commercial arbitration hallmark of confidentiality into far-reaching transparency features. Today all ICSID cases, the primary ISA venue, are publicly registered with basic information about the parties and claims. A large majority of ICSID awards and annulment committee decisions are available on the ICSID homepage as well as on other publicly accessible Internet sites. 
Arbitrator Independence and Ethics
Linked to a perceived lack of transparency, critics of ISA also often call for "ethical requirements for arbitrators." Such demands seem to be inspired by concerns about private justice operating in secrecy, and thus beyond scrutiny, as it was first formulated in the context of the NAFTA anti-ISDS discussion. 156 The identical or at least similar composition of the actual decision-makers should enhance the likelihood of a consistent case-law. Apparently, the major advantage expected from introducing an appellate mechanism lies in securing more coherence and consistency of investment awards. Clearly, appeals to be decided by a limited number of largely identical decision-makers are likely to be consistent. 157 Consolidated CETA text, supra note 1, art X.42. 158 See supra text at note 72. 159 See e.g. "investment treaty arbitration law", online: <www.italaw.com/>; "investment claims", online: <http://oxia.ouplaw.com/>. 160 See supra note 83. 161 See supra note 84. 162 Consolidated CETA text, supra note 1, art X.33(1) ("The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules shall apply to the disclosure of information to the public concerning disputes under this Section as modified by this Chapter."). 163 Consolidated CETA text, supra note 1, art X.33(5) ("Hearings shall be open to the public The tribunal shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements to facilitate public access to such hearings. Where the tribunal determines that there is a need to protect confidential or protected information, it shall make the appropriate arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such protection.
[…]"). 164 See supra note 72.
Meanwhile, the lack of oversight of private lawyers deciding ISA claims is equally deplored in the European debate. 165 As already mentioned, many of these concerns have been taken into account by a number of amendments to the arbitrator ethics rules. 166 To further strengthen this development it should be noted that, for instance, in the EU-Singapore FTA, negotiated in parallel to CETA, a code of conduct for arbitrators has been included. 167 In substance, however, this code does not add much to the existing obligations under most arbitration rules demanding independence and impartiality of arbitrators.
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Limitation of Claims to Lawfully Made Investments: Avoidance of Frivolous and Harassing Claims
ISA critics often deplore the harassment factor of investment claims forcing host states to take out expensive legal representation. Thus, various demands have been made to ensure that unmeritorious or frivolous claims, as well as claims based on unlawfully made investments, should be excluded from benefiting from ISA.
A number of legal devices have already been developed, both in IIA treaty making as well as in arbitral practice. So-called "in accordance with host State law" clauses in IIAs, as well as an inherent legality requirement of the notion of an "investment" under article 25 ICSID Convention have been used to extend ISA protection only to lawfully made investments. As well, tribunals have used their discretionary powers to allocate costs in order to punish "frivolous" or "harassing" litigants.
CETA incorporates some of these developments and makes them mandatory for ISA, pursuant to its rules. An interesting provision thus limiting the scope of potential arbitration claims can be found in article X.17 CETA, which provides: "For greater certainty, an investor may not submit a claim to arbitration under this Section where the investment has been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of process." 169 What this novel provision aims at is the exclusion of claims made by investors in cases such as Inceysa v El Salvador 170 and Phoenix v Czech Republic, where it has been argued that the investments were made in an unlawful way. 171 In those cases the claims have been held inadmissible because they were considered to be contrary to the "in accordance with host State law" clause. However, a closer analysis of, in particular, the Inceysa case demonstrates that such reasoning was a bit complicated and not wholly an innovative provision on alternative dispute settlement by providing for a permanent option of mediation, 181 clearly inspired by the WTO conciliation/mediation possibilities, which are also available during the entire process of settling trade disputes. 182 Additionally, Annex III to CETA ("Mediation Procedure") provides detailed procedural guidelines for the finding of mutually agreed solutions through mediation. While the extremely short time period of 60 days 183 does not appear to provide a realistic option for the resolution of often highly technical and complex investment disputes, this language is clearly hortatory only and will not prevent disputing parties from continuing to engage in mediation.
THE SEPTEMBER 2015 PROPOSAL
Many of the ISA ideas formulated in the draft CETA and the EU-Singapore agreement were taken up and further refined in the mid-September 2015 "Commission draft text TTIP -investment." 184 Apparently without any prior consultation of the US negotiating partner, 185 the European Commission integrated the demands for a permanent investment court raised by the Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament as well as by many TTIP-critical voices in Europe into a new proposal for an investment chapter of the TTIP. The most remarkable part of that proposal, which reinforces the idea of "taming" the unpredictable outcomes of ISA, is the idea of an investment court to handle future investment disputes.
But the draft text of the TTIP's investment chapter also contains a few additions on substantive issues aimed at preserving the right to regulate and clarifying that investor protection should not be too high. For instance, a new article specifically states that all protection standards in the investment chapter shall not affect the sovereign "right to regulate" of host states and to pursue legitimate policy objectives. 186 Countering the frequently heard, 187 but erroneous, 188 criticism that ISA would offer a right of investors to sue when they consider their profits reduced, the new text proposal clarifies that none of the investment protection standards should be interpreted as an implied stabilization clause that would trigger a right to recover expected lost profits if breached. 189 It even contains a Micula-inspired 190 clause, pursuant to which state aid should become insulated from investment law to the effect that the latter cannot lead to an obligation to compensate for the discontinuance of the granting of subsidies.
191
The investment court ideas are found in section 3 of the September draft text of the TTIP. 192 It contains a number of further procedural details aimed at embedding the new "investment court" system into the broader system of investment dispute settlement and at further eliminating the risk of too many claims.
